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Recent developments in the communications industries show a steady movement from
direct regulation to increased reliance on free market incentives.  As a believer in the efficiency of
market incentives,  I regard elimination or substantial reduction of regulation, assuming
competition is a feasible alternative, as a good result.  Of course, deregulation should be
accompanied by a greater role for fundamental antitrust analysis and enforcement, lest the old
shackles be replaced by new ones of private manufacture.  
One theme of my remarks today is that antitrust, if it is to be effective in these newly
deregulated areas, must take into account the special circumstances of each industry.  Different
sectors of the communications industry were regulated for different reasons, and the transition of
various sectors to a free market may be complete or incomplete.  As long as antitrust adheres to
its tradition of paying careful attention to the facts of each industry, it can play a useful role.
Today I would like to offer some general observations about the transition from regulation
to free market incentives and then address more specifically what is “new” about antitrust
approaches in the communications industries.  In examining what is new, I will in several instances
draw examples from the Federal Trade Commission’s recent action in requiring restructuring of
the proposed deal involving Time Warner-Turner-TCI and then its approval of the transaction as
restructured.  As always, let me remind you that the views I express today are my own and do not
represent the views of the Commission or any other Commissioner.
2A.  General Observations 
Let me begin by outlining a few principles that apply across the board to newly
deregulated industries.
First, participants in a deregulated industry, accustomed to coordinated action among
themselves or the protection of regulators who guarantee a monopoly franchise, often seek to
extend anticompetitive aspects to a newly deregulated regime.  Cartel behavior in place of
government price restrictions is a classic example.  In my own limited experience, this has not
been a problem with respect to networks, cable distribution and cable programming.  But there
can be strong incentives for incumbents to keep new entrants out of what used to be the
incumbent’s protected domain.  Obviously, that can be a problem.
Second, transition out of regulation is almost never complete and immediate.  Rather, a
patchwork of state, federal and international rules on protection from competition continues to
apply.  Serious regulatory problems arise where some players in an industry are regulated and
some are not, with the unregulated free to raise or cut prices in pursuit of various competitive
strategies.  It is difficult and often unfair to try to maintain a system for long where direct
competitors are subject to radically different regulatory rules.  For example, many believe that a
principal reason truck transportation was regulated for a time in the United States is because
railroads were regulated, trucks were not, and competition between the two was impossible to
maintain on anything approaching a fair basis.  In a deregulatory environment, we should always
be looking for ways to equalize treatment by reducing regulatory burdens on incumbents rather
than by increasing them on new entrants.
  There may be exceptions, particularly in markets providing alternative conduits rather1
than content (such as cellular telephone services or two cable companies serving the same area),
and especially where products or services are sold to small businesses or individuals and prices are
public.
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Third, some policy goals can be handled comfortably in a regulatory regime but are not
congenial to antitrust enforcement.  During a transition some continuing regulation may be
necessary -- for example, caps on cable rates or mandated access to local markets -- to assist
during the period before full competition emerges.
Fourth, as a result of the first three points, application of antitrust to newly deregulated
industries often involves unconventional issues from the point of view of traditional antitrust.  The
very fact that an industrial sector was regulated suggests the possibility of some past market
failure, or at least some competitive peculiarities (or perhaps what the legislature thought were
peculiarities), and therefore calls for a special sensitivity in applying conventional antitrust rules. 
B.  What is “new” about antitrust approaches in communications industries?
While antitrust fundamentals can apply to the communications industries, those industries
are not the same as steel mills and grocery stores and therefore call for adjusted approaches. 
Let me list six points which if not entirely new are at least different.
First, the principal antitrust concerns in communications markets usually involve unilateral
rather than coordinated effects.  In communications markets, products are highly differentiated,1
transactions between suppliers and distributors are often not observable, buyers are large and
sophisticated -- all contributing to the fact that coordinated effects, i.e., price fixing or conscious
parallelism, are not likely.  For example, in the Time Warner-Turner merger, both companies were
exceptionally large producers of cable programming.  But, cable programming is highly
4differentiated:  There are news offerings such as CNN, movie channels such as HBO, sports
channels, family channels, cartoon channels, etc.  Even if the merger significantly increased
concentration in cable programming, demonstrating coordinated effects in the pricing of such
programming may have been possible but certainly would have been difficult.
Second, because of the dynamic nature of markets and the impact of new technologies, the
primary concern in communications arrangements is often access. That is because the entry of
new technologies, and firms, is likely to dissipate market power over time, and so markets will
tend to be self-correcting unless entry is impeded in some way.  That in turn implicates vertical
relationships between players in the market, because one method of exclusion is to deny access to
critical inputs.  Thus, one central aim of antitrust should be to protect the ability of markets to
eliminate private restraints and reinvent themselves by precluding private restrictions on access to
inputs that are critical to competition.  Much of the order in Time Warner was designed to
prevent the company’s large cable subsidiary from discriminating against new programmers (who
might compete with company-owned CNN and HBO), and preventing Time Warner’s large
programming business from discriminating against new methods of distributing programming to
households in competition with its downstream cable companies.
One of the most difficult problems in antitrust analysis arises where a firm, or a group of
firms through joint venture, obtains a bottleneck position in a marketplace.  In some situations,
customers and suppliers cannot survive in the marketplace without access to the bottleneck
product or service, and rivals cannot effectively compete.  
Antitrust sometimes requires that a monopolist or joint venture with enormous market
power make its product or service available to all on fair and nondiscriminatory terms.  An
  United States v. Terminal Railroad Association, 224 U.S. 383 (1912).2
  For a detailed presentation of the facts, see David Reiffen and Andrew N. Kleit,3
Terminal Railroad Revisited:  Foreclosure of an Essential Facility or Simple Horizontal
Monopoly?, 33 J. LAW & ECON. 419 (1990).
  224 U.S. at 410-11.4
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example is the T rminal Railroad case.  There, a group of 14 railroads owned the Terminal2
Railroad Association of St. Louis.  The association controlled, through acquisitions, the two
bridges and one ferry service that could be used to transport railcars across the Mississippi River
at St. Louis.  The river ran between St. Louis and East St. Louis, so railroads had to use bridges
or ferries to get across the river, and terminal facilities were needed to connect individual railroads
to the bridges and ferry facilities.  One peculiarity of the situation was that none of the 24
railroads that served St. Louis had a line that passed all the way through.  All of them had a
terminus on one side of the river or the other, so interconnection facilities were essential to serve
both St. Louis and East St. Louis, and points beyond.  Thus, none of the railroads could transport
railcars across the river without using the association’s facilities.  3
Since there was no other economically feasible way to get railcars across the river at St.
Louis, the joint venture had market power.  One remedy option was to undo the acquisitions, so
there would again be two or three independent companies operating the facilities. The Supreme
Court did not select that option as its remedy of choice, because it found that consolidation of the
facilities provided substantial efficiency benefits and that the unified terminal system was of "great
public advantage."  Instead, the Court ordered that the joint venture membership be open to any4
present or future railroad on "just and reasonable terms" that would place all railroads on a level
playing field.  In addition, any railroad that did not elect to become a member was to be given
  Id. at 411.  The analysis by Reiffen and Kleit, supra, questions whether the association5
actually foreclosed access by non-members.  The government’s principal theory of the case seems
to have been monopolization resulting in high prices, lower service and entry deterrence.  See
Reiffen and Kleit at 432-36.
  224 U.S. at 412.6
  Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).7
  In part, a new member, if it was fortunate enough to be admitted, was required to pay8
10% of the total amount of the regular assessments paid to the association by the old members in
the relevant market since October 1, 1900 -- approximately a 40-year period.  Id. at 10-11.  That
requirement did not apply to applicants that would not compete with an existing member.
  What made the situation worse was that in many cities AP members also had contracts9
with UP and International News Service that required new newspapers to pay a large sum to enter
the market.  Id. at 13.
6
access to the terminal facilities, again on "just and reasonable terms."  But the Court may have5
recognized the difficulty of reaching agreement on what constitutes "just and reasonable" terms,
because its fall-back position was to order dissolution of the asset consolidation if the parties
could not reach an agreement that was in substantial accord with the access order.6
A less intrusive form of antitrust solution would simply direct the monopolist not to
exclude customers, suppliers and potential competitors for an anticompetitive reason.  The
Associated Press case provides an example of that.  There, approximately 65% of the newspapers7
in this country were members of AP, a joint venture news gathering association that prohibited its
members from selling news to non-members.  The Court found that newspapers that lacked access
to AP news were competitively disadvantaged.  Moreover, competitors of existing members had
to go through special hoops to become members, and the incumbents had effective veto power. 8       9
The case is often cited in support of an argument for mandated access to an "essential facility,"
but the remedial order in that case was actually quite limited.  Basically, the Court held that
  Id. at 21.10
7
membership may not be withheld through discrimination based on competitive status. 
Specifically, a member of the joint venture was not to be given the power to exclude a competitor,
and the by-laws were to provide that an applicant’s competitive status was not to be considered in
passing upon the application.  The reason for that more restrained remedial approach (compared10
to the one in Terminal Railroad) was not made clear in the Court’s opinion, but it may have had
something to do with the degree of need for access.  There were two other sizable news gathering
organizations (United Press International and International Press Service), as well as many smaller
ones.  Newspapers without AP service were found to be at a competitive disadvantage, but the
Court did not say that membership in AP was essential for competition to exist.  
But there may have been a more fundamental reason for the restrained hand in A sociated
Press.  The kind of approach used in Terminal Railroad, so like conventional “regulation,” is
usually a stretch for antitrust.  Antitrust rarely mandates access for several reasons: (1) if access is
too easy, companies will be inclined to lie back and take no risks on the assumption they can free
ride on the earlier investment and energy of their competitors;  (2) permitting easy access for
competitors can dampen the incentives for firms to undertake risky and costly investments in the
first place, unless there are countervailing first-mover advantages; and (3) it achieves little to
mandate access unless there is also provision to insure that price and other terms and conditions
of sale are “reasonable;” otherwise the monopolist can agree to grant access but introduce terms
that are so onerous that as a practical matter access is unavailable.  But regulating price and other
  It should be noted that in Terminal Railroad nd Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States,11
410 U.S. 366 (1973), another case involving mandated access, the courts could defer to
regulatory bodies to determine the proper terms of access.
  FTC v. Questar Corp., No. 2:95CV 1137S (D.Utah 1995) (transaction abandoned);12
FTC Press Release, FTC to Challenge Questar Acquisition of Kern River, Alleging Monopoly
Over Natural Gas Transmission into Salt Lake City Area, Dec. 27, 1995.
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terms of sale on a continuing basis is exactly the thing that antitrust (as compared to a regulatory
agency with ongoing oversight of firms in the industry) is ill-equipped to manage.11
Third, conglomerate effects are relevant in newly deregulated industries, but the scope of
the doctrine is likely to emphasize actual or perceived potential competition.   Indeed, since many
deregulated firms will have been monopolists, the most important challenges for a time often will
be from firms that are not present rivals in the market.  
The Federal Trade Commission demonstrated its willingness to challenge a merger for its
anticompetitive conglomerate effects in the Questar case, which involved a situation not unlike12
that occurring in communications.  The case involved the natural gas market in Salt Lake City,
Utah.  Questar was an integrated energy company, from natural gas production, interstate pipeline
transmission, and local gas distribution.  Questar was the only pipeline serving large industrial
customers in the Salt Lake City area, who generally bypassed the local utility and purchased gas
directly from other sources.  Those customers used Questar’s pipeline services to transport the
gas either directly to their facilities or to the local utility, from which they purchased local
transportation service.  
Questar sought to acquire from Tenneco a 50% stake in Kern River Gas Transmission
Company, which operated another interstate pipeline running through the area and was planning,
not coincidentally, to build a lateral pipeline to serve industrial customers in competition with
  Kern River was a partnership owned in equal shares by a subsidiary of Tenneco and13
The Williams Companies, Inc.
  The district court complaint also pled the loss of actual competition.14
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Questar.  That was one of the benefits of recent steps to deregulate the natural gas industry. 13
Large customers could select their own suppliers, and contract separately for transportation of the
gas.  The evidence showed that Kern River was already having an effect on the market, before any
lateral hookups were even built.  It was actively soliciting customers, and Questar, in response,
reduced prices to certain customers.  Thus, potential entry was having precisely the kind of effect
we would expect, and Questar’s monopoly position was clearly threatened, if not already eroded. 
Questar’s response was not surprising -- buy a major piece of the prospective competitor.
The potential competition theory in Questar involved primarily the actual potential entry
theory, but there was also an element of perceived potential entry.  Kern Rive  was an actual14
potential entrant in that it was actually planning to enter, and entry would have had a significant
procompetitive effect on the market.  There was also evidence that Kern River was perceived as a
potential entrant at an earlier stage.  Theory predicts that a perceived likelihood of entry can
induce an incumbent firm to engage in limit pricing -- i.e., moderate prices -- to discourage entry.
There was evidence of that here.  Having strong evidence of both kinds of effects made this a
particularly compelling case.  Questar offered a settlement, but it would have been too regulatory
and it did not address the adverse effect of the acquisition on Questar’s incentives to compete
aggressively against the new entrant.  The Commission authorized its staff to file for a preliminary
injunction, and the parties promptly abandoned the transaction.  The 50% interest in Kern River
  104 F.T.C. 852, 916 (1984).15
  See, e.g., Philip E. Areeda and Herbert Hovenkamp, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1121'e (199616
Supp.) at 821.
  To the extent a "clear proof" standard relies on subjective evidence, see B.A.T., 10417
F.T.C. at 927-28, agency or court decisions may be based on evidence that is unreliable, because
company statements may be motivated by a desire to influence agency review or merger litigation. 
See V Philip E. Areeda and Donald F. Turner, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1121b (1980) at 103; Philip E.
Areeda and Herbert Hovenkamp, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1121'b (1996 Supp.) at 819 ("Few potential
entrants will be found under [the B.A.T.] test").
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that Questar tried to buy was later acquired by The Williams Companies, which already owned the
other 50% and had wanted to maintain Kern River’s competitive independence.
When the theory of anticompetitive effect turns on actual potential entry analysis -- i. .,
but for the merger, the acquiring party would have entered the market independently -- a question
arises as to the level of proof required to demonstrate that potential entry down the road would
have occurred.  In the Federal Trade Commission’s 1984 decision in B.A.T. Industries, Ltd.,  a15
majority of the Commission concluded that a reasonable probability of entry was not enough and
that "clear proof" that entry would occur was required.  In this case, clear proof meant "concrete
plans" such as a capital acquisition plan or a budget drawn up with entry in mind.
I believe the "clear proof" standard is inappropriate and in fact essentially guts the actual
potential competition doctrine.  Section 7 only requires that the effect of the transaction "may be"
to lessen competition, and that has been interpreted in the majority of litigated cases as requiring
only a reasonable probability.  At a more practical level, it is precisely in the most16
anticompetitive of conglomerate acquisitions that it is least likely that the government or a private
party would discover documents assessing the prospects for entry other than by merger.  I17
would not impose a "clear proof" standard if a conglomerate merger were to come up today. 
  FTC Staff Report:  ANTICIPATING THE 21ST CENTURY:  COMPETITION POLICY IN THE18
NEW HIGH-TECH GLOBAL MARKETPLACE (May 1996) at 18-19.
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Fourth, in the communications sector, markets tend to be dynamic and high-tech, and
therefore rivalry frequently occurs primarily in the form of competitive innovation.  That
observation is consistent with the general conclusions of the Federal Trade Commission’s staff
report on competition policy in high-tech and global markets, that competition in particular
market segments increasingly focuses on various dimensions of innovation.  Tele-18
communications is an example of that kind of industry.
The fact that a market is “dynamic,” however, does not automatically lead to the
conclusion that antitrust enforcement has no responsibilities.   For example, let’s assume it was
certain that local cable companies, at present monopolists or near monopolists, would have their
market position challenged effectively by direct broadcast satellite transmissions, phone
companies moving into the cable market, and even computer screens becoming a medium to
transmit the kind of news and entertainment presently on cable.  In anticipation of that rivalry, the
legislature may decide to eliminate prior regulatory restraints.  But the question remains as to
when this newly introduced rivalry will become effective.  Otherwise anticompetitive mergers,
long term contracts or distribution arrangements cannot be justified on grounds that eventually
their anticompetitive effects will be dissipated by new entry.  Even if “eventually” is only 2 or 3
years away, there remains the concern that consumers will be exploited while we wait for the
future to arrive.
For example, in Time Warner, some believed that new distribution technologies, such as
DBS and other digital delivery systems, would put competitive pressures on both cable
  Time Warner, Inc., Dkt. No. C-3709, Separate Statement of Chairman Pitofsky, and19
Commissioners Steiger and Varney, Feb. 7, 1997.
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distributors and programmers to offer quality programming at reasonable prices.  But a majority
of the Commission, myself included, did not see that in the evidence.  Not yet.  Alternative
technologies such as DBS had only a small foothold in the market, with perhaps a 3% share of all
subscribers.  Moreover, DBS is more costly, including up-front equipment costs, and it lacks the
carriage of local stations.  We included DBS in the relevant market, but it did not appear likely
that this emerging technology would be sufficient to prevent the competitive harm from the Time-
Warner-Turner-TCI transaction.  More recently, an investigation of a proposed merger of two19
head-to-head competitors in cable distribution produced similar kinds of evidence.  These two
companies competed for the same group of customers in an "overbuild" situation, where more
than one cable company is franchised by the local authority to serve the same geographic area. 
The evidence indicated that DBS may not have been in the relevant market, and was unlikely to
constrain anticompetitive conduct in any event.
Another antitrust concern -- mentioned already but worth repeating -- is that it is precisely
in a dynamic marketplace that it becomes particularly important to insure that private
arrangements do not impede the ability of new technologies to enter the market.  Indeed, that is
one of the reasons the order in Time Warner prevents the company from disadvantaging 
competitors at the distribution level by discriminating in access to programming.
Fifth, antitrust enforcement efforts to preserve and protect access sometimes lead to rather
regulatory decrees.  Not always, of course.  In my view, one of the most important aspects in
requiring that the Time Warner-Turner-TCI deal be restructured was the requirement that TCI in
13
effect give up its previous stock position in Turner and move to a stock position in which it had
less influence on Time Warner.  If TCI and Time Warner, two of  the largest cable companies in
the United States, had the incentive and ability through stock ownership to influence the behavior
of the other or to moderate their own behavior to benefit the other, that could have had a serious
effect on the incentive and ability of programming rivals of the two companies to innovate or
achieve access to the market.
In other situations, decrees can minimize the degree of regulation and maximize the impact
of market forces.  The most widely noted aspect of the Time Warner decree was the requirement
that Time Warner set aside at least one channel for a news service that would compete with
Turner’s CNN.  Given CNN’s dominant position as a 24-hour news service, and Time Warner’s
strong position as a cable outlet, the merger could have entrenched CNN against future
competition.  Because of the acquisition, Time Warner had an incentive not to carry a competing
all-news service, and a news network seeking to enter the market would have had a difficult time
reaching a sufficient number of subscribers to be viable without carriage on Time Warner cable. 
This was a situation we needed to address.  But the remedy was designed to be as non-intrusive
as possible -- specifically, making available at least one Time Warner cable channel for 3 or 5
years depending on how Time Warner chose to satisfy the requirement.  The Commission
recognized that this is an area with First Amendment overtones and therefore left Time Warner
free to use its own judgment in choosing the acquirer of the assets and in negotiating the price
that it would be paid.  Some objective criteria were adopted to insure that the second news
service would be a significant competitor to CNN, and for that we relied on CNN’s own
definition of itself in its contracts with cable companies.  My own view is that if an applicant for
  It has been said that regulatory agencies are more flexible and less hesitant than courts20
in balancing competing factors in its analysis.  See Stephen G. Breyer, Antitrust, Der gulation
(continued...)
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the channel satisfied the essentials of serving as a rival to CNN -- for example, it was a 24-hour
news service but happened not to carry sports -- the Commission should not object to Time
Warner satisfying the decree by accepting that applicant.
By citing examples of modest “regulatory” decree provisions, I don’t mean to slight the
problem.  If it is important to protect access, and surely that will be of paramount importance in
many dynamic industries, fairly elaborate provisions that protect against barriers to access, by
discrimination or otherwise, will often be necessary.
Sixth, because telecommunications markets are complex and dynamic, joint ventures and
other strategic alliances will often be a preferred form of doing business.  We recognize, partly
because the witnesses in our global competition hearings told us so, that American antitrust law
with respect to joint ventures and other forms of competitor collaboration is less than clear.  It is
for that reason that the Commission has authorized its Policy Planning Staff for its next project to
develop proposed guidelines for joint ventures and other forms of competitor collaboration.
C.  Institutional Differences
Perhaps the most important consequences of moving from regulation to antitrust result
from institutional differences between the two regimes.  Antitrust relies heavily on legal precedent
based on a clearly-defined principle of protecting the competitive process and consumer welfare,
and cases may be pursued in any of a large number of forums, in both private and federal agency
actions.  In a regulatory regime, decisions are made by a prescribed agency, and they often try to
balance the interests of a wide range of considerations and constituencies.  Parenthetically, the20
(...continued)20
and the Newly Liberated Marketplace, 75 CALIF. L. REV. l005, l043 (l987).
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Federal Trade Commission has perhaps the best of both worlds:  a clear mission and a consistent
forum that develops expertise in particular issues over time.
Another difference is that regulatory agencies (and here I am excluding the FTC) have an
ongoing relationship with the industry they regulate.  That can be good in the sense that they
develop a fact base from which to operate and a sensitivity to particular types of problems; it may
be bad in the sense that regulators sometimes adopt the viewpoint of the firms that they regulate. 
Antitrust reaches for rules of general applicability across all industries, although at its best it pays
attention to the special facts of particular industries.  
Perhaps the most troublesome difference is that if antitrust is to govern, competition
policy can derive from decisions in scores of different courts, as federal and state agencies and
private parties bring suits to advance their interests.  Although the courts do rely on precedent,
which should produce consistency in the result, it is not that easy.  The facts and the laws are
complex, the economics may be even more complex, and the interests of the litigants are diverse. 
And, frankly, some courts are better at the task than others.  The resulting problem is that it may
be difficult to discern a coherent, consistent policy.  In fact, we have something approaching that
situation in the many court cases dealing with long distance and local telephone service in the
wake of deregulation.  Some would say that is a temporary problem that will tend to disappear
once the transition from regulation to competition is complete.  But that transition can take a
while and the disorder, inefficiency and general mess produced by scores of antitrust cases, often
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reaching inconsistent results, is not a good thing.  Some creative thinking about how to handle
those transitional problems in an orderly way would certainly help.  
D.  Conclusion
To sum up the answer to the central question -- what is new in antitrust approaches in
communications industries -- the answer is not so much in the basic antitrust rules we apply --
they have been around for years -- but how we apply them.  There is, I believe, an increased
understanding and appreciation of the difficulty of making regulatory decisions in dynamic
markets that will promote the competitive process and other statutory goals without having
unintended adverse effects on incentives or the ability of firms to compete.  That applies to both
regulatory agency decisions and to antitrust.  That does not mean that antitrust should be timid in
dealing with such industries.  On the contrary, antitrust has an important role to play in keeping
markets open for competition.  But antitrust rules and remedies must be applied with an
understanding and consideration of the particular facts of each industry.
